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SCRUTINY OF THE VENIRE, SCRUTINY FROM THE
BENCH: SMITHKLINE BEECHAM CORP. V. ABBOTT
LABORATORIES AND THE APPLICATION OF
HEIGHTENED SCRUTINY TO SEXUAL
ORIENTATION CLASSIFICATIONS
Parker Williams+
Many younger people may see changing attitudes toward gay men and
lesbians 1 as an inevitable social progression. 2 However, until recently, the
disparate treatment of gay people under the law did not raise a significant
constitutional question.3 In 1972, the U.S. Supreme Court in Baker v. Nelson4
dismissed an appeal by two gay men who were denied a marriage license “for
want of [a] substantial federal question.” 5 In doing so, the Supreme Court
affirmed the lower court’s conclusion that a state’s interest in protecting
different-sex6 marriage, an “institution . . . as old as the book of Genesis,” was a
+
J.D. Candidate, May 2016, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law; B.A.,
2010, American University. The author would like to thank his parents, Carol and Tedd Williams,
and his brother, Riley, for their unconditional love and support, Professors Sarah Duggin, Megan
La Belle, and Laurie Lewis for all that they have done to make this Note possible, the editors and
staff of the Catholic University Law Review for their efforts in bringing this Note to publication,
and Brian Esposito, whose love and sense of humor make the workload that much easier to carry.
This Note is dedicated to the memory of the author’s friend, Sarah Phenix Brewer, whose tireless
work and kind soul changed the world.
1. This Note uses the phrase “gay men and lesbians” solely for semantics. The court in
SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Laboratories held that “heightened scrutiny applies to
classifications based on sexual orientation” which would likely extend to bisexual men and women,
as “sexual orientation” typically encompasses bisexuality. SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott
Labs., 740 F.3d 471, 489 (9th Cir.), en banc reh’g denied, 759 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2014). See also
Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, AM. PSYCHOL. ASS’N, http://www.apa.org/topics/
lgbt/index.aspx (last visited Apr. 14, 2015) (discussing various sexual orientations).
2. See, e.g., Carol Morello, Poll: 3 in 4 Americans Say Same-Sex Marriage Is Inevitable,
WASH. POST (June 6, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/poll-3-in-4-americans-saysame-sex-marriage-is-inevitable/2013/06/06/9e921da6-cea8-11e2-8845d970ccb04497_story.html
(stating that a 2013 Pew Research Center Poll found that “[seventy-two] percent [of respondents]
called same-sex marriage inevitable”); see also Changing Attitudes on Gay Marriage, PEW RES.
CTR. (Sept. 24, 2014), http://www.pewforum.org/2014/09/24/graphics-slideshow-changingattitudes-on-gay-marriage/ (representing that according to Pew Research Center polling data, the
percentage of respondents born in 1981 or later who supported same-sex marriage rose from fiftyone percent in 2003 to sixty-seven percent in 2014).
3. See infra notes 4–8 and accompanying text.
4. 409 U.S. 810 (1972).
5. Id. at 810.
6. This Note employs the term “different-sex” in lieu of “opposite-sex” or “traditional”
because it best aligns with the intention of the author, which is to be as objective and respectful as
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“commonsense and . . . constitutional” objective that justified divergent
treatment between different-sex and same-sex couples in the issuance of
marriage licenses.7 The protection of certain longstanding beliefs about sexual
morality prevailed under rational basis review, the most deferential level of
judicial scrutiny,8 for many years after Baker.9
Nevertheless, in the past twenty years or so, lower federal courts have begun
applying a more “searching form of . . . review” 10 to sexual orientation
classifications.11 While many recent cases impacting the lesbian, gay, bisexual,
and transgender community (LGBT) have concerned issues surrounding
marriage, 12 one recent non-marriage case altered how some courts scrutinize
sexual orientation classifications: SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott
Laboratories.13 SmithKline involved an illegal peremptory strike during voir
dire in a lawsuit over a licensing agreement for Human Immunodeficiency Virus
(HIV) medications.14
In SmithKline, SmithKline sued Abbott claiming “antitrust, contract, and
unfair trade practice (UPTA)” violations associated with a contract for the
licensing and pricing of HIV medications.15 During voir dire, Abbott exercised
possible. Specifically, the Note intends to be respectful to everyone who does not identify their sex
or gender(s) based on traditional norms. See generally Trans, Genderqueer, and Queer Terms
Glossary, UNIV. OF WIS.-MADISON LGBT CAMPUS CTR., http://lgbt.wisc.edu/documents/
Trans_and_queer_glossary.pdf (last visited Feb. 16, 2015) (discussing various conceptions of
gender).
7. Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 186–87 (Minn. 1971) (comparing the distinction
between “a marital restriction based merely upon race and one based upon the fundamental
difference in sex”).
8. STEVEN J. EAGLE, REGULATORY TAKINGS § 1-9(f)(1), at 1-113 to -114 (5th ed. 2014).
9. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986) (concluding that a state’s moral
disapproval of homosexual activity served as a rational basis for an anti-sodomy law), overruled
by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Andersen v. King Cnty., 138 P.3d 963, 985 (Wash.
2006) (en banc) (finding that “limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples” survived rational basis
review because it “further[ed] the State’s interests in procreation and encouraging families with a
mother and father”).
10. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 580 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“When a law exhibits . . . a desire
to harm a politically unpopular group, we have applied a more searching form of rational basis
review . . . .”).
11. See id. at 564 (majority opinion) (reviewing a state statute criminalizing homosexual
conduct under the Due Process Clause); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 624–28 (1996) (conducting
an in-depth review of a Colorado constitutional amendment eviscerating state ordinances
prohibiting anti-homosexual discrimination).
12. See, e.g., Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2662–63 (2013) (holding that
proponents of different-sex marriage in California lacked standing to challenge a U.S. District
Court’s overturning of the state’s same-sex marriage ban); United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct.
2675, 2693 (2013) (striking down the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) because it failed to
“recognize[] and accept[] state definitions of marriage” so as to “deprive same-sex couples of the
benefits and responsibilities that come with the federal recognition of their marriages”).
13. 740 F.3d 471, 474 (9th Cir.), en banc reh’g denied, 759 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2014).
14. Id.
15. Id.
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its first peremptory challenge against the only openly gay member of the jury
pool.16 SmithKline challenged the strike as impermissible discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation under the principles announced in Batson v.
Kentucky,17 where the Supreme Court held that purposeful discrimination during
jury selection based on race was not constitutionally permissible.18 Chief Judge
Claudia Wilken, the presiding judge, expressed uncertainty about whether
Batson extended to sexual orientation or civil cases, but ultimately denied the
challenge.19
After the jury returned a mixed verdict, SmithKline appealed the decision to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. 20 SmithKline argued that
Abbott’s peremptory strike was unconstitutional, and, therefore, it tainted the
jury pool and necessitated a new trial.21 After considering the arguments, the
Ninth Circuit held explicitly that the peremptory strike violated Batson because
“heightened scrutiny” applied to sexual orientation classifications in jury
selection and that equal protection principles forbid striking a juror because of
sexual orientation.22
SmithKline is significant for the LGBT community because it adds sexual
orientation to the small group of classifications, such as race23 and gender,24
which cannot be the basis for peremptory strikes in the Ninth Circuit. 25
Furthermore, SmithKline reaffirms that gay men and lesbians can make
meaningful contributions to civic life and may not be prevented from
contributing to the judicial process based on their sexual orientation.26
By holding unambiguously that equal protection forbids peremptory strikes
because of sexual orientation, SmithKline advances the progress made in one of
the Supreme Court’s more recent sexual orientation cases, United States v.
Windsor, 27 toward applying heightened scrutiny to sexual orientation

16. Id. The venire is the “panel of persons selected for jury duty and from among whom the
jurors are to be chosen.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1789 (10th ed. 2014).
17. 476 U.S. 79, 100 (1986).
18. Id. at 97–98, 100 (“If the trial court decides that the facts establish, prima facie, purposeful
discrimination and the prosecutor does not come forward with a neutral explanation for his action
. . . [the] petitioner’s conviction [will] be reversed.”).
19. SmithKline, 740 F.3d at 474–75.
20. Id. at 475.
21. Id. at 475, 488–89.
22. Id. at 472, 475–76, 484, 489.
23. See, e.g., Batson, 476 U.S. at 89 (prohibiting peremptory strikes based on race).
24. See, e.g., J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 129 (1994) (prohibiting
peremptory strikes based on gender).
25. See Ian Bartrum, The Ninth Circuit’s Treatment of Sexual Orientation: Defining
“Rational Basis Review With Bite”, 112 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 142, 149 (2014)
(discussing the significance of SmithKline in the Ninth Circuit).
26. SmithKline, 740 F.3d at 485.
27. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).

806

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 64:803

classifications.28 SmithKline explicitly applied heightened scrutiny to a sexual
orientation classification, 29 whereas Windsor emphasized principles of
federalism; specifically, a state’s right to define marriage as it pleases.30 As a
result, the Ninth Circuit will demand that sexual orientation classifications be
“narrowly tailored” and advance a “significant government interest.”31
This Note will examine why the Ninth Circuit correctly applied heightened
scrutiny to a sexual orientation classification, as well as SmithKline’s
implications for future application of the standard in federal courts. First, this
Note summarizes the different levels of judicial scrutiny that federal courts have
applied in recent years. It then analyzes the origins of peremptory strikes and
the “Batson Challenge.” Next, this Note draws on these foundations to explore
the Ninth Circuit’s decision in SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott
Laboratories. This Note concludes by arguing that the Ninth Circuit’s analysis
was appropriate and that SmithKline will continue to influence lower federal
courts, and perhaps someday the Supreme Court, to apply heightened scrutiny
to sexual orientation classifications.
I. THE ORIGINS AND TIERS OF MODERN JUDICIAL SCRUTINY
Modern judicial scrutiny originated during the New Deal Era.32 While federal
courts asserted their authority to review federal and state actions more than a
century before that period,33 they continued to grapple with determining how far
legislation’s presumption of constitutionality extended.34
This question concerned not only what level of deference to afford legislative
and executive actions, but also the “nature of law and the relative importance of
asserted rights.”35 Proponents of the theory that the law “emanat[es] from the

28. See SmithKline, 740 F.3d at 484 (“[W]e are required by Windsor to apply heightened
scrutiny to classifications based on sexual orientation for purposes of equal protection.”); see also
Bartrum, supra note 25, at 148–50 (observing how the Ninth Circuit in SmithKline looked to
Windsor, which in turn “relied heavily on heightened-review cases”).
29. SmithKline, 740 F.3d at 483–84.
30. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2692. See also Zachary D. Caplan, How an Antitrust Case Changed
the Gay Marriage Debate, LAW360 (May 21, 2014), http://www.law360.com/articles/540178/
how-an-antitrust-case-changed-the-gay-marriage-debate (“[I]n Windsor, the Supreme Court rested
its decision largely on federalism concerns and avoided the equal protection issue.”).
31. EAGLE, supra note 8, § 1-9(f)(4), at 1-121 (quoting Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local
Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
32. See id. § 1-9(e)–(f), at 1-110.2 to -113 (discussing the foundational cases for modern
judicial scrutiny, such as United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938), and West
Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937), as being cases of the New Deal era).
33. See, e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 436–37 (1819) (concluding that the states
did not have the constitutional authority to tax a bank established by Congress).
34. RICHARD H. GASKINS, BURDENS OF PROOF IN MODERN DISCOURSE 21–22 (1992).
35. EAGLE, supra note 8, § 1-9(e), at 1-110.2 to -110.3.
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state g[ave legislation] a strong presumption” of constitutionality.36 On the other
hand, advocates of a “presumption of liberty” approach emphasized the need to
“place a strong burden on the state to justify any limitation on the exercise of
liberty.”37 The Supreme Court has not adopted either doctrine explicitly, but has
instead applied the presumption it deems appropriate on a case-by-case basis.38
United States v. Carolene Products Co.39 changed how courts examine the
constitutionality of state actions. 40 However, it did not involve any of the
controversial issues of the times, such as fair wages 41 or safe employment
conditions,42 but rather milk.43 In 1923, Congress passed the Filled Milk Act,
which “prohibit[ed] the shipment in interstate commerce of . . . milk
compounded with any fat or oil other than milk fat.”44 The Court addressed
whether the Act exceeded congressional authority “to regulate interstate
commerce or infringe[d] the Fifth Amendment” by “depriving [Carolene
Products of] its property without due process of law.”45 The Supreme Court
upheld the Act as constitutional under Congress’s power to regulate interstate
commerce.46
But for several features,47 Carolene Products may have become an otherwise
infrequently cited case from the New Deal Era that built upon President
36. EAGLE, supra note 8, § 1-9(e), at 1-110.3. Compare JOHN AUSTIN, LECTURES ON
JURISPRUDENCE OR THE PHILOSOPHY OF POSITIVE LAW 248 (Robert Campbell ed., 5th ed. 1885)
(stating that courts should view the legislative acts of the appointed legislature of the states as
“legally invalid” if they conflict directly with the Constitution of the “ulterior legislatures”
comprised of “citizens appointing the ordinary legislature”), with Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v.
Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 84 (1980) (concluding that a limitation on private property owners resulting
from state regulations of property rights did not amount to a taking under the Fifth Amendment nor
overstep the state’s ability to impose reasonable property restrictions).
37. EAGLE, supra note 8, § 1-9(e), at 1-110.3 (citing Randy E. Barnett, Introduction:
Implementing the Ninth Amendment, in 2 THE RIGHTS RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE: THE HISTORY
AND MEANING OF THE NINTH AMENDMENT 1 (Randy E. Barnett ed., 1993)).
38. Id.
39. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
40. See William D. Araiza, The Section 5 Power and the Rational Basis Standard of Equal
Protection, 79 TUL. L. REV. 519, 531 (2005) (stating that Carolene Products “has played an
important role in the development of the three-tiered scrutiny scheme”).
41. See, e.g., W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 386 (1937) (concerning the
constitutionality of a minimum wage law).
42. See, e.g., United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 109 (1941) (concerning Congress’s ability
to regulate working conditions under the Fair Labor Standards Act).
43. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 145–46.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 146–47.
46. Id. at 154.
47. Carolene Products extended a trend from other New Deal cases that placed the burden
upon the citizen to prove a regulation’s unconstitutionality, rather than requiring the government to
assert the right to exercise its police power. EAGLE, supra note 8, § 1-9(e)(1), at 1-111 to -113.
See Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 152 (“[R]egulatory legislation affecting ordinary commercial
transactions is not to be pronounced unconstitutional unless . . . it is of such a character as to
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Roosevelt’s emphasis on state regulation in a variety of industries.48 Carolene
Products is most famous for its fourth footnote.49 Footnote four discusses the
presumption of a law’s constitutionality:
There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of
constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a
specific prohibition of the Constitution . . . . Nor need we enquire
whether similar considerations enter into the review of statutes
directed at particular religious, national, or racial minorities[;] whether
prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special
condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those
political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities,
and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial
inquiry.50
The Court’s minor footnote established the foundation for the judicial evaluation
of legislation’s constitutionality.51
Around the turn of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court earned the ire of
many by striking down legislation designed to regulate areas encompassing the
quality of workers’ lives.52 During this time, the Court sought to “reassert its
authority” with a “new constitutional rhetoric” to better mirror new political and
social attitudes.53 Through Carolene Products, the Court dispensed with the
preclude the assumption that it rests upon some rational basis within the knowledge and experience
of the legislators.”); see also Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 90–92 (1949) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring) (“Mere legislative preference for one rather than another means for combating
substantive evils, therefore, may well prove an inadequate foundation on which to rest regulations
which are aimed at or in their operation diminish the effective exercise of rights so necessary to the
maintenance of democratic institutions.”) (quoting Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 95 (1940)
(internal quotation marks omitted)). According to Steven Eagle, “[i]n . . . Kovacs v. Cooper, the
Court elaborated upon footnote four of Carolene Products by constructing a doctrine of a preferred
position for civil rights over property rights.” EAGLE, supra note 8, § 1-9(f)(5), at 1-123 (footnote
omitted).
48. EAGLE, supra note 8, § 1-9(e)(1), at 1-111 to -113.
49. See id. § 1-9(e)(1), at 1-111 (stating that Justice Powell once called the footnote “the most
celebrated footnote in constitutional law” (quoting Lewis Powell, Carolene Products Revisited, 82
COLUM. L. REV 1087, 1087 (1982) (internal quotation marks omitted))).
50. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 152–53 n.4 (citations omitted).
51. See EAGLE, supra note 8, § 1-9(e)(1), at 1-111 to -113 (discussing the impact of Carolene
Products).
52. See, e.g., Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 276–77 (1918) (striking down a law
prohibiting interstate commerce in goods made with child labor); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S.
45, 64 (1905) (striking down a statute limiting working hours based on “freedom of master and
employé [sic] to contract”); see also Lise Johnson & Oleksandr Volkov, Investor-State Contracts,
Host-State “Commitments” and the Myth of Stability in International Law, 24 AM. REV. INT’L
ARB. 361, 405 (2013) (“[T]he [Supreme] Court’s decisions striking down social legislation in the
name of protecting laissez-faire capitalism had been triggering legislative and public ire since the
beginning of the era . . . .”).
53. See EAGLE, supra note 8, § 1-9(e)(1), at 1-112 to -113 (quoting Bruce A. Ackerman,
Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713, 714–15 (1985) (explaining how the Supreme
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constitutional notion of liberty-of-contract and “[i]nstead . . . proposed to make
the ideals of the victorious activist Democracy serve as a primary foundation for
constitutional rights in the United States.”54
Carolene Products hinted at the possibility of a tiered system of review, where
legislation would be examined under one of three levels of scrutiny 55 to
determine whether it violates due process or equal protection principles.56 The
first, and most deferential level of review, is rational basis, which presumes that
legislation is constitutional if it “has a rational relationship to a legitimate
governmental purpose and if no fundamental right or that of a protected class is
affected.”57 Federal courts often apply rational basis review when examining
economic legislation. 58 However, the presumption of constitutionality has
occasionally caused courts to speculate about a potential explanation for
legislation and its nexus with the challenged classification.59

Court reconfigured its method for analyzing the constitutionality of legislation in the 1930s by
embracing New Deal Era values and rejecting the laissez-faire emphasis on individual rights)).
54. Id. § 1-9(e)(1), at 1-113 (quoting Ackerman, supra note 53, at 715). See also Ferguson v.
Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730, 732–33 (1963) (upholding a Kansas law regulating debt adjustment
procedures and affirming that it is not the role of the judiciary to substitute its own wisdom for that
of the states regarding business and industrial regulations).
55. Arguably, federal courts may apply a fourth tier of scrutiny that falls in between rational
basis and heightened scrutiny, sometimes referred to as “covert heightened scrutiny,” “second order
rational basis,” or “rational basis with bite.” EAGLE, supra note 8, § 1-9(f)(3), at 1-117 (internal
quotation marks omitted) (citing City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 458
(1985) (Marshall, J., concurring)); LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1612
(2d ed. 1988); Gerald Gunther, Forward, In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A
Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 20–24 (1972). A prominent case
applying “rational basis with bite” was City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., where the
Court applied the standard to classifications for the mentally disabled. See EAGLE, supra note 8, §
1-9(f)(3), at 1-117 to -118. Cleburne concluded that while the mentally disabled were not a quasisuspect class, they would still be protected from unfair discrimination by equal protection review
analyzing their liberty interests against the government’s asserted interests. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at
446.
56. EAGLE, supra note 8, § 1-9(f)(1), at 1-113.
57. Id. Rational basis originates from the principle that “legislation must seek to promote
legitimate public purposes . . . and that the government must pursue its ends by reasonable means.”
Id. at 1-114 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Some Confusions
About Due Process, Judicial Review, and Constitutional Remedies, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 309, 315–
16 (1993)). In particular, legislation regulating economic affairs receives a “very high” level of
deference. Id. See also McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961) (concluding that
“statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to
justify it”).
58. See EAGLE, supra note 8, § 1-9(f)(1), at 1-114 (“The Supreme Court regularly employs
the rational basis test in reviewing statutes with social as well as economic purposes.”).
59. See id. (citing Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487 (1955)
(speculating about the reasons a state legislature could have made certain medical examinations
prerequisites for obtaining or copying lenses, and stating that it was the role of the legislature to
weigh the consequences of the new laws it enacts)).
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The second, and arguably least-developed level of scrutiny is “intermediate”
or heightened scrutiny. 60 Heightened scrutiny determines whether the
challenged classification is “narrowly tailored to serve a significant government
interest.” 61 Specifically, heightened scrutiny applies to groups that have
“suffered a history of discrimination” and where the classification lacks a
relationship with the individual’s ability to contribute to the community. 62
Courts will also analyze the political power of a classified group, as well as
whether the group’s “defining characteristic is immutable” or otherwise
unchangeable.63
Heightened scrutiny analyzes the contested classification’s importance and
requires a close nexus between the classification and an important government
objective. 64 Moreover, heightened scrutiny demands an examination of the
impact on the aggrieved parties, thus compelling the government to articulate
how the legislation advances its objective and “discourage[es] after-the-fact
justifications for the classification.” 65 Courts apply heightened scrutiny to
classifications and subject matters such as sex, illegitimacy, and the right to
travel.66
60. See, e.g., Larry Hoekstra II, Where the Fundamental Issue is the Absence of a
Fundamental Right: Intrastate Movement and the Constitutionality of Juvenile Curfew Laws, 9
WHITTIER J. CHILD & FAM. ADVOC. 137, 142 (2009) (“Intermediate scrutiny is the newest method
of equal protection analysis, developed . . . to bridge the gap between rational basis review and
strict scrutiny.”).
61. See EAGLE, supra note 8, § 1-9(f)(4), at 1-121 (quoting Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local
Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Perry applied
heightened scrutiny to find that a school district’s denial of access to its internal mail system to a
union other than the recognized teacher’s union did not offend First Amendment principles. Perry
Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 45–46.
62. See Brief of Amici Curiae Lambda Legal and Twelve Other Legal and Public Interest
Organizations in Support of Plaintiff-Appellee SmithKline Beecham Corporation DBA
GlaxoSmithKline and in Support of Reversal of the Judgment Below at 12–13, SmithKline
Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 740 F.3d 471 (9th Cir.) (Nos. 2011-17357, 2011-17373)
(“[H]eightened scrutiny is warranted where a classified group has ‘experienced a ‘history of
purposeful unequal treatment’ or been subjected to unique disabilities on the basis of stereotyped
characteristics not truly indicative of their abilities.’”) (quoting Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427
U.S. 307, 313 (1976)), en banc reh’g denied, 759 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2014).
63. Brief for Amici Curiae Lambda Legal, supra note 62, at 13 (quoting Lyng v. Castillo, 477
U.S. 635, 638 (1986) (holding that the “disadvantaged class” in the case, “comprised [of] parents,
children, and siblings,” did not qualify as a suspect or quasi-suspect class and therefore was
ineligible for heightened scrutiny in part because of a lack of “immutable . . . characteristics that
define them as a discrete group”)).
64. See EAGLE, supra note 8, § 1-9(f)(4), at 1-121 to -122 (discussing the showing required
of the government in order for legislation to pass muster under heightened scrutiny).
65. Id. § 1-9(f)(4), at 1-122. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996)
(indicating that the Court’s skepticism toward Virginia’s arguments for banning women from the
Virginia Military Institute reflected an acknowledgement of the nation’s history of sex-based
discrimination).
66. See EAGLE, supra note 8, § 1-9(f)(4), at 1-121 to -122 (citing Mills v. Habluetzel, 456
U.S. 91, 98–101 (1982) (applying heightened scrutiny to a Texas law imposing a time limit for
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The third and highest level of review is strict scrutiny. 67 Strict scrutiny
assumes that some government actions may burden “fundamental rights” and
must be “intense[ly] review[ed]” to determine if a compelling government
objective exists and whether the classification is narrowly tailored. 68 Strict
scrutiny represents a pushback against the laissez-faire attitude that dominated
the early twentieth century.69
In order to trigger strict scrutiny, a plaintiff must allege a violation of a
fundamental right. 70 The Supreme Court has held a number of rights to be
“fundamental,” including the freedom to exercise one’s religion,71 “the freedom
of association,” 72 and the “freedom of expression from content-based
regulation.”73 Some classifications, such as those based on race, are also subject
to strict scrutiny.74 Moreover, in addition to many of the enumerated rights in
the Constitution, the Court has declared a number of other rights to be

seeking paternal support for illegitimate children and concluding that it was not substantially related
to Texas’s purported interests); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 202–04 (1976) (rejecting an
Oklahoma law that treated men and women differently with regard to the minimum age permitted
to purchase 3.2% beer); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 14–15 (1965) (reaffirming that the right to
travel is constitutionally protected while analyzing a challenge to the refusal by the Secretary of
State to validate travel to Cuba)).
67. See EAGLE, supra note 8, § 1-9(f)(5), at 1-122 (discussing strict scrutiny’s application of
extremely rigorous review to “preserve liberty and equality”).
68. Id.; see Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 920 (1995) (“To satisfy strict scrutiny, the State
must demonstrate that its . . . legislation is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling interest.”).
69. See EAGLE, supra note 8, § 1-9(f)(5), at 1-122 (“Strict scrutiny represents a continuation
of existing notions of natural rights-based, substantive due process, after economic substantive due
process was repudiated in the economic arena . . . .”).
70. See id. (“The notion of ‘strict scrutiny’ is predicated on the idea that statutes and
regulations reflecting the popular will may burden fundamental rights or work against racial or
other minorities.”).
71. Id. § 1-9(f)(5), at 1-123 (citing Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 205, 215
(1963) (confirming that a citizen’s right to exercise his or her religion is a fundamental liberty in
the Constitution)).
72. See id. (citing NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460–61 (1958) (declaring that the
freedom of association is indivisible from the constitutional concept of liberty and enhances other
First Amendment rights), rev’d on other grounds, 360 U.S. 240 (1959)).
73. See id. (citing R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 395–96 (1992) (overturning a city
ordinance that banned bias-motivated conduct because it was not sufficiently tailored and had a
chilling effect on the freedom of expression)).
74. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 222 (1995) (maintaining that “the
standard of review under the Equal Protection Clause is not dependent on the race of those burdened
or benefitted by a particular classification” and thus the appropriate standard of review for all racial
classifications is “strict scrutiny” (quoting Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493–94
(1989)) (internal quotation marks omitted)), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Adarand Constructors
v. Slater, 528 U.S. 216 (2000); see also Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 430–32 (1984) (affirming
that strict scrutiny was the appropriate standard of review when the State impermissibly gave
custody to the father in a custody case after the mother remarried an African American man).
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“fundamental” as well, including private and consensual sexual activity, 75
marriage, 76 abortion, 77 and the right to be free from racial discrimination in
municipal land use regulations.78
II. THE ORIGINS AND ROLE OF PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES IN THE AMERICAN
JUDICIAL PROCESS
While peremptory challenges have not been declared a fundamental right,
they are designed to help ensure a fair trial for the defendant.79 Peremptory
challenges date back to at least the fourteenth century.80 Defendants charged
with a felony were entitled to thirty-five peremptory challenges during this
period, but the King had an unlimited number of challenges.81 Moreover, the
King did not have to provide any explanation for a peremptory challenge if a full
jury was empaneled.82
The Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution guarantees the defendant a
fairly selected jury. 83 The Supreme Court has limited the requirement of

75. See EAGLE, supra note 8, § 1-9(f)(5), at 1-123 (citing Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438
(1972) (limiting a state’s ability to pass laws that effectively regulate private sexual conduct);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (striking down a Connecticut law that imposed
excessive regulations on private and consensual sexual conduct by banning the use of
contraceptives)).
76. See id. (citing Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (reaffirming that marriage is a
fundamental right and is essential to the liberty established by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment)); see also Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (concluding that
marriage is a “basic civil right[]” (quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942))
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
77. See EAGLE, supra note 8, § 1-9(f)(5), at 1-123 (citing Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833 (1992) (discerning that the fundamental nature of the rights at issue guided the Court to
reaffirm the central holding in Roe v. Wade); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (deciding that the
fundamental rights included in the concept of liberty in the Fourteenth Amendment include the
right to terminate a pregnancy)).
78. See id. (citing Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977)
(observing that a single discriminatory act by the government, using its zoning power, may give
rise to an equal protection violation if certain criteria are met)).
79. See John J. Neal, Striking Batson Gold at the End of the Rainbow? Revisiting Batson v.
Kentucky and its Progeny in Light of Romer v. Evans and Lawrence v. Texas, 91 IOWA L. REV.
1091, 1093–94 (2006) (discussing how parties can use peremptory challenges to remove potentially
biased jurors).
80. See id. at 1095 & n.19 (discussing the origins of the peremptory challenge during King
Edward’s reign).
81. Id. at 1095.
82. See id. (“[T]he Crown’s challenges were unlimited, and only upon the failure to impanel
a full jury was the Crown required to establish cause.”).
83. See id. at 1096 & n.27 (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to
a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have
been committed . . . .” (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. VI) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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empaneling an “impartial jury” to mean that a “fair cross-section” of the
community is represented on the jury as much as possible.84
The Constitution does not require that Congress “enact [peremptory
challenges] . . . to facilitate the system of impaneling an impartial jury.” 85
Nevertheless, in 1790, Congress provided that a defendant being tried for treason
would receive thirty-five peremptory challenges and twenty for other felony
proceedings “punishable by death.” 86 In the nineteenth century, Congress
enacted legislation allowing states to pass their own laws providing for the
“designation and empanelling of juries” in both civil and criminal cases. 87
Currently, each party has three peremptory challenges in civil cases, but the trial
judge has discretion to provide additional challenges where the parties are joint
or severable.88
Congress and the courts did not address discrimination targeting minority
groups for much of the nation’s first century.89 However, in 1879, the Supreme
Court, in the case of Strauder v. West Virginia,90 addressed discrimination in
jury empanelling.91 Strauder analyzed the constitutionality of a West Virginia
statute limiting jury service to white males.92 Ultimately, the Supreme Court
struck down the statute and held that a person was denied equal protection when
members of his or her own race were systematically excluded from juries. 93
Strauder did not stand for the proposition that a jury must be the same race as
the defendant in order to ensure a fair trial. 94 Rather, the Court limited its
84. See id. at 1096 n.27 (citing Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979) (requiring that
one of the elements of a fair cross-section violation is that the defendant must show an excluded
group to be part of a “‘distinctive group’ in the community”); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522,
526–28 (1975) (finding that the exclusion of women from juries absent a written declaration of
their desire to serve as potential jurors deprived a criminal defendant of his Sixth Amendment “fair
cross section” rights under the guarantee of an impartial jury)).
85. Id. at 1096 (citing Stilson v. United States, 250 U.S. 583, 586 (1919)).
86. Id. (citing Act for Regulating the Military Establishment of the United States, ch. 10, §
30, 1 Stat. 119, 199 (1790)).
87. Id. at 1097 (citing Amendment to Act to Establish the Judicial Courts of the United States,
ch. 47, 5 Stat. 394, 394 (1840)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
88. Id. at 1096–97 n.30 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1870 (2012)).
89. See, e.g., Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. 506, 526 (1858) (upholding a law permitting the
capture of fugitive slaves); Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393, 422 (1856) (holding that even free African
Americans were not citizens).
90. 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
91. Neal, supra note 79, at 1098 (citing Strauder, 100 U.S. at 310).
92. Id. (citing Strauder, 100 U.S. at 305).
93. Strauder, 100 U.S. at 310.
94. See Neal, supra note 79, at 1098 (citing Strauder, 100 U.S. at 305). The Court further
concluded that:
We do not say that . . . a State may not prescribe the qualifications of its jurors, and in
doing so make discriminations. It may confine the selection to males, to freeholders, to
citizens, to persons within certain ages, or to persons having educational qualifications.
We do not believe the Fourteenth Amendment was ever intended to prohibit this.
Strauder, 100 U.S. at 310.
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holding to the intentional exclusion of jurors based on race, and discussed the
adverse consequences of purposeful discrimination “based on a group
characteristic.”95 At a time when Jim Crow laws were in their nascence, and the
Supreme Court was still a few years away from limiting Congress’s ability to
pass remedial legislation addressing racial discrimination, Strauder’s
proposition was extraordinary.96
Almost a century after Strauder, in 1965, the Supreme Court, in Swain v.
Alabama, 97 analyzed peremptory challenges and the makeup of juries. 98 In
Swain, an African American man was convicted of rape and sentenced to
death.99 In challenging the conviction, he argued that Alabama discriminated
purposefully against every African American venire member during voir dire.100
The Supreme Court held that the defendant’s equal protection rights were not
violated because there was insufficient state action; specifically, the defense
counsel’s role did not have a sufficient nexus to the role traditionally fulfilled by
a state actor.101 While Swain represented a step backward from the progress
made in Strauder, it also held that the constitutional prohibition on intentional
exclusion in voir dire extended to all “identifiable group[s] in the community”
who may fall victim to prejudice.102 Although not readily apparent in Swain,
this extension would be crucial for other groups arguing against purposeful
discrimination in voir dire.
A. Batson v. Kentucky and Discriminatory Selection in Voir Dire Proceedings
Two decades after Swain, in Batson v. Kentucky, 103 the Supreme Court
revisited racially discriminatory peremptory challenges. 104 In Batson, the
prosecutor used his peremptory challenges to strike all the African-American
members on the venire.105 The Supreme Court held that racially discriminatory
peremptory challenges violated the Equal Protection Clause.106 Batson asserted
that prosecutors “must articulate a neutral explanation related to the particular
95. Neal, supra note 79, at 1098 (citing Strauder, 100 U.S. at 309, 310, 312).
96. Compare Strauder, 100 U.S. at 310 (holding that state legislation excluding African
Americans from the venire violates the African American defendant’s equal protection rights under
the Fourteenth Amendment), with The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 18–19 (1883) (holding,
almost four years later, that the Fourteenth Amendment did not give Congress authority to dictate
antidiscrimination laws to the States).
97. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
98. Neal, supra note 79, at 1098 (citing Swain, 380 U.S. at 205, 209).
99. Swain, 380 U.S. at 203.
100. Id. at 202–03.
101. Id. at 221–22, 227.
102. Neal, supra note 79, at 1099 (quoting Swain, 380 U.S. at 204–05) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
103. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
104. Neal, supra note 79, at 1099 (citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 93).
105. Batson, 476 U.S. at 83.
106. Id. at 97–98.
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case to be tried” for a peremptory strike to be upheld. 107 Ultimately, the
Supreme Court concluded that the African-American jurors were struck illegally
from the venire based on invidious racial discrimination.108
Moreover, the Supreme Court noted that the impact of discriminatory
peremptory strikes reached well beyond the courtroom, stating that “[t]he harm
from discriminatory jury selection extends beyond that inflicted on the defendant
and the excluded juror to touch the entire community,” and that purposeful
discrimination in the jury selection process “undermine[s] public confidence in
the fairness of our system of justice.”109
Less than a decade later, the Supreme Court extended Batson’s protection to
gender classifications in J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B. 110 J.E.B. involved a
challenge to the discriminatory use of peremptory strikes against men in
Alabama. 111 However, the crux of the decision focused on the history of
discrimination against women in civic participation.112 Applying heightened
scrutiny, which is the standard the Court typically uses to review sex-based
classifications, 113 the Supreme Court held that Alabama’s actions were
unconstitutional.114 As the Court noted, heightened scrutiny required the State
to establish both “an exceedingly persuasive justification” for the classification
and a close nexus between the classification and the justification.115 Keeping in
line with Strauder and Batson, the Court reiterated the dual harms to the
community at-large and the judiciary’s legitimacy when discrimination is
permitted in the courtroom. 116 Additionally, it declared that discriminatory

107. Id. See Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 632 (1972) (confirming that “affirmations
of good faith” that individual peremptory challenges were not illegal “are insufficient” to prove
that a discriminatory intent was not present in the strike).
108. Batson, 476 U.S. at 87 (citing Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1879)
(reaffirming that Strauder stood for the proposition that racially motivated strikes from a jury pool
are constitutionally impermissible)).
109. Neal, supra note 79, at 1099–1100 nn.53–54 (quoting Batson, 476 U.S. at 87) (internal
quotation marks omitted). The Court further stated, “[d]iscrimination within the judicial system is
most pernicious because it is a ‘stimulant to that . . . prejudice which is an impediment to securing
. . . equal justice which the law aims to secure to all others.’” Batson, 476 U.S. at 87–88 (quoting
Strauder, 100 U.S. at 308).
110. 511 U.S. 127, 128–29 (1994).
111. Neal, supra note 79, at 1104 (citing J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 129).
112. Id. The Court noted that “[g]ender-based peremptory strikes were hardly practicable” for
many years because “until the 20th century, women were completely excluded from jury service.”
J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 131.
113. Neal, supra note 79, at 1104 (citing J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 136).
114. See J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 129, 136–37.
115. Neal, supra note 79, at 1104 (quoting J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 136–37) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
116. J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 140 (warning that litigants could be harmed if discrimination
contaminated judicial proceedings, and that the community could be harmed if the judicial system
allowed its credibility to be degraded by discrimination).
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strikes imparted the message that certain members of the community were
unqualified or unworthy to participate in a vital civic duty— jury duty.117
III. LOWER FEDERAL COURTS’ PREVIOUS TREATMENT OF SEXUAL
ORIENTATION CLASSIFICATIONS
While some groups, such as racial minorities and women, achieved progress
for their agendas through the courts in the latter half of the twentieth century,118
gay men and lesbians often faced a more arduous path in their push for equal
rights. Indeed, Baker’s rationale represented the norm for how federal courts
and society treated gay men and lesbians for many years. 119 Many courts,
including the Ninth Circuit, acknowledged that gay men and lesbians have
experienced purposeful discrimination “in the public and private spheres”
throughout the country’s history. 120 This treatment, and the underlying
disapproval of gay men and lesbians, extended to national security concerns
regarding gay men applying for security clearances, 121 immigration law, 122
reenlistment in the U.S. Army, 123 and disparate sentencing guidelines for
unlawful voluntary sexual acts committed by homosexual minors.124 No court

117. See id. at 142 (“The message [striking a venire member based on pernicious stereotypes]
sends to all those in the courtroom, and all those who may later learn of the discriminatory act, is
that certain individuals, for no reason other than gender, are presumed unqualified by state actors
to decide important questions upon which reasonable persons could disagree.”)
118. See, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 74 (1971) (striking down an Idaho law giving men
preference over women in the administration of estates as contrary to equal protection principles);
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (concluding that racial segregation in public
schools violates the Equal Protection Clause).
119. See supra notes 4–9 and accompanying text; see also Brief for Amici Curiae Lambda
Legal, supra note 62, at 14–15 (discussing instances where the Court has recognized the social
discrimination that gay men and lesbians have faced).
120. Brief for Amici Curiae Lambda Legal, supra note 62, at 42.
121. See High Tech Gays v. Def. Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 577–78 (9th Cir.
1990) (recognizing that requiring gay agents to undergo expanded background checks because the
Department of Defense received counterintelligence that the KGB was blackmailing gay American
agents does not create a genuine issue of a constitutional violation, “even if [the expanded security
clearance regulation was] based on continuing ignorance or prejudice” that gay men are more likely
to compromise national secrets).
122. See Boutilier v. INS, 387 U.S. 118, 118–21 (1967) (affirming an alien’s deportation based
on the alien qualifying as having a “psychopathic personality” after admitting to previously
engaging in homosexual activity (internal quotation marks omitted)).
123. See Watkins v. U.S. Army, 875 F.2d 699, 706 (1989) (rejecting the Army’s contention
under the Mindes Doctrine that reenlisting an openly gay recruit would adversely impact military
policies or affairs). See generally Mindes v. Seaman, 453 F.2d 197, 200–02 (5th Cir. 1971)
(prescribing a balancing test for courts to employ in deciding whether to review an internal military
personnel action).
124. See State v. Limon, 122 P.3d 22, 24 (Kan. 2005) (overturning a conviction under Kansas’s
“Romeo and Juliet” law regulating sexual activities between minors because the State did not have
a rational basis for creating statutory classifications based on homosexual conduct).
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addressing a sexual orientation discrimination claim has ever concluded that gay
men and lesbians have not experienced purposeful discrimination.125
A. A Shift in Course for Gay Rights: Romer v. Evans
The seemingly ironclad rationale underlying decisions such as Baker and
Bowers began to show cracks as the judiciary’s analysis of sexual orientation
classifications started changing in the mid 1990s.126 Romer v. Evans127 appeared
to introduce a more rigorous standard of review for these classifications than
courts had typically applied. 128 In Romer, Colorado voters passed a
constitutional provision that repealed all municipal ordinances enacted to protect
gay men and lesbians from discrimination.129 The Supreme Court struck down
the law under rational basis review, finding that it “fail[ed], indeed defie[d], even
[the rational basis] conventional inquiry.” 130 Yet the Supreme Court went
beyond traditional rational basis review, criticizing the amendment’s intent as
well as its disconnect from any legitimate state interest.131 The Supreme Court,
using stronger language than rational basis usually affords, noted that if equal
protection principles were to have any meaning, then a “bare . . . desire to harm
a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental
interest.”132

125. See Brief for Amici Curiae Lambda Legal, supra note 62, at 14–15 (discussing the Court’s
long history of acknowledging discrimination against gay men and lesbians and stating that “no
court to consider this issue has ever ruled otherwise”).
126. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631–32 (1996) (holding that a constitutional
amendment in Colorado burdening gay men and lesbians did not pass rational basis review).
127. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
128. Neal, supra note 79, at 1106–07 (noting that the Romer Court “based its decision on a
rational-basis standard of review and a finding of invidious discrimination,” and that “[a]lthough
the traditional Batson claim has required the affected individual to belong to a class afforded at
least heightened scrutiny . . . Romer . . . is encouraging to a Batson claim based on invidious
discrimination toward gay and lesbian jurors”).
129. Romer, 517 U.S. at 624.
130. Id. at 632.
131. Neal, supra note 79, at 1106 (quoting Romer, 517 U.S. at 632). The Court further held
that “[w]e must conclude that Amendment 2 classifies homosexuals not to further a proper
legislative end but to make them unequal to everyone else.” Id. at 1107 (quoting Romer, 517 U.S.
at 635) (internal quotation marks omitted).
132. Romer, 517 U.S. at 631–36 (alteration in original) (quoting Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno,
413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (criticizing the intent and lack of a
nexus to a legitimate state interest underlying the Colorado amendment).
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B. The Recognition of the Privacy Interests and Humanity of Gay Men and
Lesbians: Lawrence v. Texas
The progression toward a more critical level of review continued in Lawrence
v. Texas.133 In Lawrence, two men were arrested and charged with violating a
Texas anti-sodomy law by engaging in private and consensual sexual acts.134
The Supreme Court struck down the Texas statute on due process grounds,
concluding that it violated the mens’ right to privacy. 135 Despite this dueprocess-based rationale, the Supreme Court also determined that the mens’ right
to equal protection under the law and the liberty interest in private conduct
safeguarded by due process are inextricably intertwined, and a holding for one
furthers both interests.136
As in Romer, the Supreme Court’s analysis went beyond merely searching for
a legitimate state interest, but, instead, concluded that Texas “cannot demean
[gay men and lesbians’] existence or control their destiny by making their private
sexual conduct a crime,” and that the statute “further[ed] no legitimate state
interest which can justify its intrusion into the personal and private life of the
individual.”137 Compared with Bowers, which was less than twenty years old
when Lawrence was decided, the Supreme Court’s language in Lawrence
marked a significant departure from how courts typically reviewed sexual
orientation classifications.138
In her concurring opinion, Justice O’Connor compared Lawrence to other
Supreme Court cases striking down legislation under equal protection principles
where it “inhibit[ed] personal relationships,” and concluded that Lawrence
should have been decided under equal protection principles as well. 139 The
majority acknowledged Justice O’Connor’s equal protection argument, but
indicated that if the Court were to invalidate the statute under the Equal
Protection Clause, then “some might question whether a prohibition would be

133. 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003) (“When sexuality finds overt expression in intimate conduct . .
. [it] can be but one element in a personal bond that is more enduring. The liberty protected by the
Constitution allows homosexual persons the right to make this choice.”).
134. Id. at 563. The deviate sexual intercourse statute made it illegal for persons of the same
sex to engage in acts of sodomy, but was not applicable to persons of different sexes. Id. at 563–
64.
135. Id. at 578.
136. Id. at 575.
137. Id. at 578. See Neal, supra note 79, at 1109 (recognizing that equal protection principles
supplemented the Court’s holding, which was based solely on due process grounds).
138. Compare Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986) (opining that a majoritarian
disapproval of homosexuality is indeed a sufficiently rational basis for a state statute criminalizing
consensual homosexual conduct), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), with
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (overturning Bowers and asserting that people are entitled to respect and
privacy with regard to the intimate aspects of their lives).
139. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 579–80 (O’Connor, J., concurring). See also Neal, supra note 79,
at 1108.
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valid if drawn . . . to prohibit the conduct both between same-sex and differentsex participants.”140
C. A Watershed Moment for the Gay Rights Movement: United States v.
Windsor
A decade later, the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in United States v.
Windsor 141 significantly altered how courts analyze sexual orientation
classifications. 142 In Windsor, the surviving spouse in a same-sex marriage,
Edith Windsor, sued to recover taxes she paid after being denied the estate tax
exemption for surviving spouses.143 Windsor was denied the exemption because
she was excluded from the federal definition of “spouse.”144
The Supreme Court struck down the applicable portion of the Defense of
Marriage Act (DOMA), stating that it violated due process and equal protection
principles. 145 In the majority opinion, which relied heavily on federalism
grounds,146 Justice Kennedy did not state explicitly what level of scrutiny he
applied to the classification in DOMA.147 However, in language resembling
heightened scrutiny, Justice Kennedy concluded that DOMA’s “disparate
treatment” of same-sex couples could not survive any level of scrutiny because
it violated “basic due process and equal protection principles applicable to the
Federal Government.”148

140. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575 (majority opinion).
141. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
142. See id. at 2695–96 (striking down Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act on the basis
that “no legitimate purpose overcomes the purpose and effect to disparage and to injure those whom
the State, by its marriage laws, sought to protect in personhood and dignity”).
143. Id. at 2682.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 2693, 2695–96.
146. Id. at 2692. Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Windsor relied largely on notions of federalism
and the role of the State in defining marriage, and thus did not directly address the level of scrutiny
the Court applied: “[t]he State’s power in defining the marital relation is of central relevance in this
case.” Id.
147. See Bartrum, supra note 25, at 147 (stating that Justice Kennedy “declined to specify the
level of scrutiny at work”). Additionally, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit applied
heightened scrutiny in Windsor: “[H]omosexuals compose a class that is subject to heightened
scrutiny. We further conclude that the class is quasi-suspect . . . .” Windsor v. United States, 699
F.3d 169, 185 (2nd Cir. 2012), aff’d 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). See also Perry v. Schwarzenegger,
704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 997 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (determining that gay men and lesbians are the kind of
minority group that “strict scrutiny was designed to protect”), aff’d sub nom. Perry v. Brown, 671
F.3d 1052, 1096 (9th Cir. 2012), vacated for lack of jurisdiction sub. nom. Hollingsworth v. Perry,
133 S. Ct. 2652, 2668 (2013).
148. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693. Justice Kennedy, while declining to specify if he applied
heightened scrutiny to DOMA’s classification, observed that DOMA had the effect of “tell[ing] . .
. the world[] that [same-sex couples’] otherwise valid marriages are unworthy of federal
recognition,” thereby placing them in an “unstable . . . second-tier marriage” and “humiliat[ing] . .
. children now being raised by same-sex couples.” Id. at 2694.
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As in Lawrence, Justice Kennedy used language more consistent with a higher
standard of scrutiny than rational basis, framing the “liberty of the person
protected by the Fifth Amendment” as a core constitutional right. 149
Additionally, Justice Kennedy affirmed the strength of this right through the
reverse incorporation of the Equal Protection Clause, observing that while the
Fifth Amendment protected citizens from having their liberties oppressed by the
federal government, the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection guarantee
further indemnified and memorialized this protection. 150 Such language and
analysis was a far cry from the presumption of constitutionality that rational
basis review typically entails.151 Justice Kennedy’s opinion dealt a significant
blow to the arguments in support of DOMA, thus suggesting that state objectives
for sexual orientation classifications, once thought to be legitimate, might no
longer suffice.152
IV. SMITHKLINE: THE PEREMPTORY STRIKE THAT BEGAN TO CHANGE THE
NINTH CIRCUIT’S REVIEW OF SEXUAL ORIENTATION CLASSIFICATIONS
A. A Contract, a Price Increase, and a Lawsuit
In 2002, Abbott and GSK entered into a contract for the licensing and
marketing of several HIV medications.153 Later, GSK brought a lawsuit in the
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, alleging that Abbott
“increase[ed] the price of [its drug] fourfold” after signing the contract to “drive
business” toward a different drug it produced separately.154 SmithKline brought
“antitrust, contract, and unfair trade practice (UTPA) claims,” contending that
Abbott violated the contract and the law when it gave SmithKline marketing
rights to the HIV drug in combination with a drug Abbott produced before
increasing the price of the licensed drug significantly.155
B. Voir Dire and a Batson Challenge for Sexual Orientation
During voir dire, Chief Judge Claudia Wilken asked the potential jurors
questions based on their jury questionnaires, after which the attorneys for Abbott

149. See id. at 2695–96 (discussing “[t]he liberty protected by the Fifth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause” and “it[s] . . . prohibition against denying to any person the equal protection of the
laws” in the context of state recognition of same-sex marriage).
150. See Bartrum, supra note 25, at 147 (quoting Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2695).
151. See generally EAGLE, supra note 8, § 1-9(f)(1), at 1-114 (discussing rational basis review
and the generous deference it accords legislation).
152. See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2689, 2696 (stating that although the classification in Windsor
“had been deemed both necessary and fundamental” for hundreds of years, the classification serves
“no legitimate purpose” from today’s perspective).
153. SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 740 F.3d 471, 474 (9th Cir.), en banc reh’g
denied, 759 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2014).
154. Id.
155. Id.
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and SmithKline were permitted to engage in further questioning.156 When Chief
Judge Wilken questioned Juror B, the only openly gay member of the venire, he
made several references to his “partner” and repeatedly used the word “he” when
answering questions that involved information about his partner.157 Chief Judge
Wilken also referred to Juror B’s partner using the word “he” when she asked
questions.158 Additionally, Juror B revealed information regarding his job as a
computer technician for the Ninth Circuit, that he took medication produced by
Abbott or SmithKline, and that “he had friends with HIV.”159
Abbott’s lawyer, Jeffrey I. Weinberger, questioned Juror B briefly after Chief
Judge Wilken.160 Weinberger’s first question to Juror B was whether Juror B
knew anything about the medications his friends infected with HIV were
taking. 161 Juror B responded, “[n]ot really.” 162 Weinberger followed up by
asking whether Juror B knew if any of his friends with HIV were taking any of
the medications at issue in the case, including Norvir, Kaletra, and Lexiva.163
Juror B once again expressed no knowledge or personal experience with any of
the medications, although he acknowledged “he had heard of Kaletra.” 164
Weinberger asked Juror B a total of five questions, all concerning his knowledge
about the drugs at issue, and none regarding his ability to “decide the case fairly
and impartially.”165
Later, Abbott exercised its first peremptory challenge against Juror B. 166
SmithKline’s lawyer, Joseph R. Saveri, immediately brought a Batson
challenge, 167 asserting that Abbott exercised its peremptory strike in a
“discriminatory way.”168 Saveri was concerned that Juror B was struck simply
because he was gay and because the case was significant for the LGBT
community. 169 Chief Judge Wilken responded with several points requiring
clarification regarding the Batson challenge: (1) she was unsure whether Batson
extended to civil cases; (2) she did not know if Batson applied to sexual
orientation; and (3) she did not know whether venire members were being
targeted based on sexual orientation as only one member was struck on this

156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 473, 474.
Id. at 474.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 474–75.
Id. at 475.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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basis.170 Chief Judge Wilken also questioned whether Batson would even apply
in this case because “the evil of Batson is not that one person of a given group
is excluded, but that everyone is.”171
Following these questions, Chief Judge Wilken provided Weinberger an
opportunity to give an alternative basis for the peremptory strike, which he
declined, stating, “I will stand on the first three [reasons listed by Chief Judge
Wilken], your honor . . . . I have no idea whether he is gay or not.”172 Saveri
pointed out that Juror B “said on voir dire that he had a male partner.” 173
Weinberger responded that it was his first challenge and that there was no
established pattern of jurors being eliminated from the jury pool based on sexual
orientation.174 Chief Judge Wilken denied the challenge, but indicated that she
“would reconsider her ruling if Abbott struck other gay men.”175
The jury returned a mixed verdict after a four-week trial. 176 Both parties
appealed to the Ninth Circuit, with GSK arguing for a new trial on the grounds
that Abbott “unconstitutionally used a peremptory strike” based on sexual
orientation.177
C. Deciding the Merits of GSK’s Batson Challenge
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit addressed two central questions: (1) “whether the
[Equal Protection Clause] prohibits discrimination based on sexual orientation
in jury selection”; and (2) “whether classifications based on sexual orientation
are subject to a standard higher than rational basis review.”178 The court had to
examine Batson’s history and purpose to determine whether its protections
applied to sexual orientation, as well as whether jurisprudence indicated that gay
men and lesbians qualified for a higher standard of judicial review.179
The court conducted a Batson analysis, which consists of a “three-part
inquiry”: “First, the party challenging the peremptory strike must establish a
prima facie case of intentional discrimination. Second, the striking party must
give a nondiscriminatory reason for the strike. Finally, the court determines, on
the basis of the record, whether the party raising the challenge has shown
purposeful discrimination.”180

170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 474.
179. See id. at 479–80 (discussing Batson’s holding and reasoning, as well as courts’ evolving
actions in analyzing classifications based on sexual orientation).
180. Id. at 476 (citing Kesser v. Cambra, 465 F.3d 351, 359 (9th Cir. 2006)).
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In order to bring a successful Batson challenge, SmithKline needed to
“produce evidence that [(1)] the prospective juror is a member of a cognizable
group”; (2) that Abbott’s counsel used a peremptory strike against the individual
illegally because of his membership in that cognizable group; and “[(3)] the
totality of the circumstances” compels the conclusion that the strike was
prompted by the relevant characteristics of the group in question.181
The Ninth Circuit found that SmithKline successfully established a prima
facie case showing that Abbott had engaged in intentional discrimination.182 It
observed that although SmithKline could not establish that Abbott had engaged
in a pattern of discrimination because Juror B was the only openly gay member
of the venire, SmithKline still met its burden of proof partly because “a strike of
the lone member of the minority group is a ‘relevant consideration’ in
determining whether a prima facie case has been established.” 183 The court
stated that Batson’s principle of promoting jury diversity would be undercut
even if the sole member of a minority group could be struck based only upon his
or her membership in that group.184
Inferences regarding Abbott’s potential fear that Juror B might not be
impartial due to “influence[] by concern in the gay community over Abbott’s
decision to increase the price of its HIV drug” also affected the court’s
analysis.185 The court further found that controversy over the pricing of HIV
and AIDS medications in the LGBT community and reliance on “impermissible
stereotypes” served as the basis for Abbott’s strike.186 As a result, the court
found that SmithKline successfully “established a prima facie case” because it
demonstrated that discrimination had occurred.187
Weinberger’s conduct was another significant factor in the court’s
determination that Abbott acted impermissibly. 188 Weinberger chose not to
offer a neutral reason for striking Juror B, opting instead simply to adopt the
reasons Chief Judge Wilken gave for being skeptical of the validity of
SmithKline’s Batson challenge.189 The Ninth Circuit not only pointed out that
181. Id. (quoting United States v. Collins, 551 F.3d 914, 919 (9th Cir. 2009)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
182. Id.
183. Id. (quoting Crittenden v. Ayers, 624 F.3d 943, 955 (9th Cir. 2010)).
184. Id. See United States v. Chinchilla, 874 F.2d 695, 698 n.5 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[A]lthough
the striking of one or two members of the same racial group may not always constitute a prima
facie case, it is preferable for the court to err on the side of the defendant’s rights to a fair and
impartial jury.”).
185. SmithKline, 740 F.3d at 476.
186. Id. at 477.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. The Ninth Circuit also found that Chief Judge Wilken’s logic was erroneous. Id. at
477 n.2. For example, she was unsure whether Batson extended to civil cases; the court pointed
out that this was “clearly incorrect,” as the Supreme Court in Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co.,
500 U.S. 614, 631 (1991), held that a party in a civil case may raise a Batson challenge. Id.
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Chief Judge Wilken’s reasons for being skeptical of the challenge were
incorrect,190 but also that Weinberger’s assertion that he did not know that Juror
B was gay was inconsistent with the record, and thus an unsatisfactory basis for
a strike.191 For example, the court noted that Juror B repeatedly referred to his
partner using masculine pronouns.192 Furthermore, it held that merely denying
a discriminatory intent was not sufficient to uphold the peremptory strike.193
In fact, the court found Abbott’s denial of a discriminatory intent “had the
opposite effect of that intended.” 194 Because there was no factual basis to
support Abbott’s denial, it “undermine[d] [Weinberger’s] argument that his
challenge was not based on intentional discrimination.”195 For these reasons,
the court concluded that Abbott had engaged in a discriminatory practice when
it exercised its strike against Juror B.196
Abbott offered “several neutral reasons” to the Ninth Circuit for its
peremptory strike, all of which the court found highly doubtful.197 Based on the
facts, the court found that “[SmithKline] . . . established a prima facie case [of
discrimination], Abbott offered no nondiscriminatory reason for its strike . . . ,
and Abbott does not now offer in its . . . appeal any colorable neutral
explanation.”198 Indeed, the court reviewed the entire record and found that
“even based on a ‘cold record,’ that [Abbott’s] stated reasons for striking [Juror
190. Id. The court additionally found Chief Judge Wilken’s reason that Batson is inapplicable
when “only a single member of [a] given group is excluded,” was in legal error, as “[t]he
[C]onstitution forbids striking even a single prospective juror for a discriminatory purpose.” Id.
(alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Vasquez-Lopez, 22 F.3d 900, 902 (9th Cir. 1994))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
191. Id. at 477–78.
192. Id. at 477.
193. Id. at 477–78.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 478.
196. Id. In analyzing whether SmithKline had established a prima facie case successfully, the
court looked to Johnson v. California, which proclaimed:
In the unlikely hypothetical in which [counsel] declines to respond to a[n] . . . inquiry
regarding his justification for making a strike, the evidence . . . would consist not only of
the original facts from which the prima facie case was established, but also [counsel’s]
refusal to justify his strike in light of the court’s request.
Id. (quoting Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162, 171 n.6 (2005)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
197. Id. Abbott offered the following four reasons for the peremptory strike on appeal: (1) that
Juror B “had lost friends to AIDS”; (2) that Juror B knew “many people in the legal field”; (3) that
Juror B’s job as a computer technician at the Ninth Circuit in San Francisco would give him undue
influence over the other jurors in deliberations; and (4) that Juror B was the only member of the
venire to testify that “he had heard of any of the three drugs at issue.” Id. at 478 n.4. The court
found the first three of the reasons to be “pretextual” and that the “record cast[ed] strong doubt on
the fourth.” Id. For instance, regarding Abbott’s first proffered reason, the court observed that
nothing in “the record shows that Juror B had friends who died of complications due to HIV or
AIDS.” Id.
198. Id. at 479.
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B] was a pretext for purposeful discrimination.”199 Consequently, the court held
that SmithKline had successfully established its Batson challenge.200
D. Extending Batson to Sexual Orientation
After determining that Abbott purposefully discriminated against Juror B
based on his sexual orientation, the court then analyzed “whether Batson
prohibits [peremptory] strikes based on sexual orientation” by analyzing Batson
and J.E.B. 201 J.E.B. reasoned that when an illegal peremptory strike was
permitted, not only the excluded juror, but also the defendant and the community
at-large suffered.202 These two decisions are initially distinguishable: race and
gender were afforded more exacting scrutiny when Batson and J.E.B. were
respectively decided, whereas the SmithKline court cited several cases applying
rational basis to sexual orientation classifications.203 Nonetheless, to support its
assertion that rational basis was no longer the proper standard for reviewing
sexual orientation, the court also addressed more recent decisions, such as Witt
v. Department of the Air Force,204 which applied heightened scrutiny to sexual
orientation on due process grounds, and United States v. Windsor.205
The court evaluated Windsor “by considering what the [Supreme] Court
actually did, rather than by dissecting isolated pieces of text.”206 It also drew
from Witt, which read heightened scrutiny into Lawrence’s analysis via three
factors: (1) disregarding the potential “post-hoc rationalizations for a law,
required under rational basis review”; (2) “requir[ing] a ‘legitimate state interest’
to ‘justify’” the injury imposed on a group, which is more consistent with
heightened scrutiny; and (3) looking at cases that the Supreme Court analyzed
to determine whether heightened scrutiny was applied.207 Using this analytical
method, the court held that “Windsor requires that heightened scrutiny be
applied to equal protection claims involving sexual orientation

199. Id. (alterations in original) (quoting United States v. Alanis, 335 F.3d 965, 969 n.5 (9th
Cir.), amended by 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 14204 (9th Cir. July 16, 2003)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
200. Id.
201. Id. (“[P]arties may . . . exercise their peremptory challenges to remove from the venire
any group . . . of individuals normally subject to ‘rational basis’ review.” (quoting J.E.B. v.
Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 143 (1994)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
202. J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 140.
203. SmithKline, 740 F.3d at 480 (citing High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance
Office, 895 F.2d 563, 574 (9th Cir. 1990); Philips v. Perry, 106 F.3d 1420, 1425 (9th Cir. 1997)
(applying rational basis review to sexual orientation classifications)).
204. 527 F.3d 806 (9th Cir. 2008).
205. SmithKline, 740 F.3d at 480 (citing Witt, 527 F.3d at 821–22) (stating that Witt applied
heightened scrutiny to a substantive due process claim regarding the military’s Don’t Ask, Don’t
Tell policy, rather than an equal protection claim, based on the rationale in Lawrence v. Texas, 539
U.S. 558 (2003)).
206. Id. (quoting Witt, 527 F.3d at 816) (internal quotation marks omitted).
207. Id. at 480–81 (quoting Witt, 527 F.3d at 817).
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[classifications].” 208 Drawing on the concern expressed for gay men and
lesbians, the focus on resulting inequality from state action, and the “[n]otably
absent” presumption of constitutionality that accompanies rational basis review,
the court stated, “[i]n short, Windsor requires heightened scrutiny” and that
“Windsor’s heightened scrutiny applies to classifications based on sexual
orientation.”209
Subsequently, the court moved on to determine whether Batson applied to
sexual orientation classifications.210 The court looked to relevant factors, such
as reinforcing unfounded stereotypes about gay men and lesbians, the long-term
and systematic exclusion of gay men and lesbians from democratic institutions,
and the “threaten[ed] . . . impartiality of the judiciary” to reach its conclusion
that Batson forbade peremptory strikes based on sexual orientation.211
V. SMITHKLINE’S IMPACT FOR GAY MEN AND LESBIANS: A MORE EQUAL
FOOTING IN THE JURY ROOM AND BEYOND
SmithKline represents an important step in bolstering legal protections for gay
men and lesbians by subjecting sexual orientation classifications, including in
the nation’s most vital civic functions, to a more exacting form of scrutiny.212
The decision removed sexual orientation as a classification that can serve as a
basis for a peremptory strike within the Ninth Circuit’s jurisdiction, and sexual
orientation classifications in jury selection are now subject to the same standard
of review as certain other classifications, such as gender.213 Moreover, the Ninth
Circuit has expressly rejected the argument that SmithKline is not binding
precedent and has continued to apply heightened scrutiny to sexual orientation
classifications.214
Whereas previous cases, such as Romer, Lawrence, and Windsor, all applied
some hidden form of review that was “more searching” than rational basis,

208. Id. at 481.
209. Id. at 483.
210. Id. at 484.
211. Id. at 484–86.
212. See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 407 (1991) (asserting that the privilege of jury duty is
second only to the right to vote as an opportunity for the average citizen to make a contribution to
the nation’s “democratic process”); see also Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 187 (1968)
(Harlan, J., dissenting) (opining that the ability for an “ordinary citizen[’s]” ability to serve on a
jury provides him or her a “valuable opportunity to participate in a process of government,” and
could lead to a greater regard for the laws in general).
213. See SmithKline, 740 F.3d at 489 (applying “heightened scrutiny” to sexual orientation
classifications); see also J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 136 (1994) (applying
“heightened scrutiny” to gender-based classifications).
214. See Rolando v. Fox, 23 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1232–33 (D. Mont. 2014) (rejecting the
argument that the rational basis standard in High Tech Gays v. Def. Indus. Sec. Clearance Office,
895 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1990), is binding precedent in the Ninth Circuit, and thus applying
heightened scrutiny to invalidate Montana’s same-sex marriage ban).

2015]

Scrutiny of the Venire, Scrutiny from the Bench

827

SmithKline expressly applied heightened scrutiny.215 Moreover, the SmithKline
court announced that it was prepared to state the level of scrutiny it applied, even
if the Supreme Court was not.216 It also set a tougher standard for states to justify
unequal treatment of gay men and lesbians by requiring that “[the State’s]
actions are necessary to significantly further an important governmental interest;
and . . . that no less burdensome approach is likely to achieve the same
results.”217
SmithKline not only represents a “watershed moment” for gay men and
lesbians in terms of civic participation; it also reaffirms the entire trial process’s
integrity and specifically determines who can be part of a jury.218 As with race
and sex, sexual orientation classifications are now included among those groups
that “reinforce[] the constitutional urgency of ensuring that individuals are not
excluded from [the] most fundamental institutions because of their [innate
characteristics].”219 SmithKline’s rationale will likely extend to LGBT issues
and causes outside of the courtroom, “such as Arizona’s recently vetoed bill[,
because it] would have permitted businesses to refuse service to [gay men and
lesbians].”220
Unlike the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit’s decision in
Windsor,221 which was ultimately overshadowed by the Supreme Court’s later
decision, SmithKline is the first circuit-level decision to explicitly apply
heightened scrutiny to a sexual orientation classification that has not been
reviewed by the Supreme Court.222 SmithKline furthered Witt’s holding so that
due process and equal protection claims based on sexual orientation
classifications will be reviewed under heightened scrutiny.223

215. See Bartrum, supra note 25, at 149–50 (“The Ninth Circuit . . . made explicit what every
reasonable observer already knew—that Romer, Lawrence, and Windsor each applied something
more searching than traditional rational basis review—[and the Ninth Circuit] provided a standard
with which to analyze sexual-orientation cases moving forward.”).
216. Id.
217. Id. at 150.
218. Anna M. Martinez, Striking Jurors Based on Sexual Orientation is Discriminatory, 91
DENV. U. L. REV. ONLINE 71, 74 (2014).
219. SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 740 F.3d 471, 485 (9th Cir.), en banc reh’g
denied, 759 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2014).
220. Martinez, supra note 218, at 74 (citing S.B. 1062, 51st Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2014)).
221. Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169, 188 (2nd Cir. 2012) (holding that “DOMA is . .
. not substantially related to the important government interest of encouraging procreation.”), aff’d
133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
222. See Martinez, supra note 218, at 74. A spokesman for Abbott Laboratories confirmed in
early August 2014 that the company would not seek certiorari. See Dan Levine, Update 1-Drug
Company Won’t Appeal Gay Rights Ruling to Top U.S. Court, REUTERS (Aug. 5, 2014), available
at http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/08/05/abbvie-gsk-gay-idUSL2N0QB2N720140805.
223. See Bartrum, supra note 25, at 149 (“[T]he decision extended the rationale of Witt so that,
at least in the Ninth Circuit, heightened judicial scrutiny now applies to both due process and equal
protection claims brought on the basis of sexual orientation.”).
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One issue in the lives of gay men and lesbians that SmithKline has already
influenced is the ongoing same-sex marriage debate.224 While SmithKline did
not address whether a constitutional right to same-sex marriage exists, it has
affected constitutional arguments and analysis closely related to that question.225
Latta v. Otter,226 a recent Ninth Circuit case, cited SmithKline in concluding that
Idaho and Nevada’s same-sex marriage bans are unconstitutional.227 Latta noted
that Nevada’s same-sex marriage ban was only sustained in the district court
because SmithKline had not been decided at the time the district court heard the
case.228 As directed by SmithKline, the Latta court applied heightened scrutiny,
noting that even Nevada Governor Brian Sandoval stated that “[a]ny uncertainty
regarding the interpretation of Windsor was . . . dispelled by SmithKline.”229
Latta is not the only case influenced by SmithKline. Several recent petitions
for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court have cited SmithKline to argue that
the Court should apply heightened scrutiny to sexual orientation
classifications.230 Other courts have used SmithKline to strike down state laws
banning same-sex marriages.231
SmithKline’s impact is unlikely to stop with Latta and these other recent
decisions because SmithKline’s rationale provides a roadmap to find due process
and equal protection violations in discriminatory laws.232 Even ardent same-sex
224. See Caplan, supra note 30 (stating that SmithKline “gave . . . many federal district courts
. . . that have overturned gay marriage bans a pathway to conclude that the denial of marriage to
same-sex couples violates equal protection”).
225. Id.
226. 771 F.3d 456 (9th Cir.), vacated in part, 135 S. Ct. 345 (2014).
227. Id. at 464–65.
228. Id. at 464 (citing Sevcik v. Sandoval, 911 F. Supp. 2d 996 (D. Nev. 2012), rev’d sub nom.
Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d 456 (9th Cir.), vacated in part, 135 S. Ct. 345 (2014)).
229. Id. at 465 (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
230. See Response to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 7, Bogan v. Baskin, 766 F.3d 648 (7th
Cir.) (No. 14-277), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 316 (2014) (citing SmithKline in its analysis of the
Seventh Circuit’s decision in Baskin); Brief for Respondents at 16–17, Herbert v. Kitchen, 755 F.3d
1193 (10th Cir.) (No. 14-124), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 265 (2014) (citing SmithKline to argue that
the Supreme Court should take up its case to resolve a circuit split and apply heightened scrutiny
to sexual orientation classifications); Brief for Respondents at 27, Smith v. Bishop, 760 F.3d 1070
(10th Cir.) (No. 14-136), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 271 (2014) (arguing that based on a recent string
of cases, including SmithKline, the Supreme Court should apply heightened scrutiny to sexual
orientation classifications “that single out gays and lesbians for discriminatory treatment”).
231. See, e.g., Baskin, 766 F.3d at 671 (discussing SmithKline and its analysis of Windsor in
striking down state same-sex marriage prohibitions); see also Geiger v. Kitzhaber, 994 F. Supp. 2d
1128, 1141 (D. Or. 2014) (stating that the court “could independently conclude the Supreme Court
did what SmithKline persuasively concluded it did” by applying heightened scrutiny to a sexual
orientation classification). It must be noted that when Geiger was decided, an active Ninth Circuit
judge had made a sua sponte call for an en banc rehearing of the case that was ultimately denied
after Geiger was decided. Id. As a result, SmithKline was not “a truly final and binding decision”
when Geiger was decided. Id.
232. See Caplan, supra note 30 (discussing the “explosive” impact SmithKline is likely to have
on challenges to discriminatory laws and practices); see also Majors v. Jeanes, No. 2:14-cv-00518
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marriage opponents acknowledge that the bell cannot be unrung now that some
courts have found due process and equal protection violations in classifications
largely based on the moral disapproval of gay people.233 However, not every
court that cites SmithKline has followed its rationale.234 Some courts have been
skeptical of the reasoning expressed in SmithKline and decisions influenced by
SmithKline, creating a circuit split that only the Supreme Court can resolve.235
When the Supreme Court hears and decides the same-sex marriage cases
coming from the Sixth Circuit this term, it can examine its own trend, including
Romer, Lawrence, and Windsor, all of which reviewed sexual orientation
classifications with criteria resembling something more than rational basis.236
The Supreme Court can observe the overwhelmingly one-sided circuit split in
same-sex marriage cases237 to resolve whether gay men and lesbians are being
treated fairly under the law in its current form, or to treat them as a suspect or
JWS, 2014 WL 4541173, at *3 (D. Ariz. Sept. 12, 2014) (noting that SmithKline eviscerated any
remaining notion that gay men and lesbians still represented a classification that was only entitled
to rational basis review).
233. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2709–10 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(“How easy it is, indeed how inevitable, to reach the same conclusion [that same-sex marriage bans
are unconstitutional] with regard to state laws . . . . In sum, that Court which finds it so horrific
that Congress robbed same-sex couples of the ‘personhood and dignity’ which state legislatures
conferred upon them, will . . . be . . . appalled by state legislatures’ irrational and hateful failure to
acknowledge that ‘personhood and dignity’ in the first place . . . . [I]t is just a matter of listening
and waiting for the other shoe.” (citations omitted)).
Laws limiting marriage to different-sex
couples, both at the state and federal levels, have largely been justified on the basis of protecting
“traditional” views of morality and the family unit structure. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 104-664, at
16 (1996) (stating that DOMA expresses “both moral disapproval of homosexuality, and a moral
conviction that heterosexuality better comports with traditional (especially Judeo-Christian)
morality” (footnote omitted)); 1995 Idaho Sess. Laws, 334, 335 (“It is the intent of this act to
promote the stability and best interests of marriage and the family [by inserting the phrase ‘between
a man and a woman’ into the state’s marriage law]. . . . Its stability is basic to morality and
civilization . . . .”).
234. See Robicheaux v. Caldwell, 2 F. Supp. 3d 910, 917 n.8 (E.D. La. 2014) (stating that the
court was “not persuaded by” SmithKline). In upholding Louisiana’s same-sex marriage ban, under
rational basis review, the court said, “[i]f the Supreme Court meant to apply heightened scrutiny, it
would have said so.” Id. at 917.
235. Lyle Denniston, Sixth Circuit: Now, a Split on Same-Sex Marriage, SCOTUSBLOG (Nov.
6, 2014, 4:50 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/11/sixth-circuit-the-split-on-same-sexmarriage/ (noting that, with the Sixth Circuit upholding same-sex marriage bans and the Fourth,
Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits striking them down, the Supreme Court may find it necessary
to resolve this “stark” split of “fundamental constitutional significance”).
236. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693 (2013) (discussing DOMA’s
“interference with the equal dignity of same-sex marriages” as permitted by state governments);
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (discussing the privacy and “respect” that should be
accorded to gay men and lesbians involved in consensual sexual practices); Romer v. Evans, 517
U.S. 620, 634–35 (1996) (stating that the Colorado constitutional amendment repealing antidiscrimination provisions in ordinances protecting gay men and lesbians lacked a “legitimate
governmental interest” (quoting Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
237. See Denniston, supra note 235.
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quasi-suspect class like SmithKline, and arguably Windsor, did.238 In view of
this circuit split, the Supreme Court would be correct to find that marriage, which
was declared a fundamental right in Loving v. Virginia,239 extends equally to
same-sex couples. Additionally, the Supreme Court now has both its own
precedent and a sweeping legal trend in courts across the nation to support a
decision declaring gay men and lesbians to be, at minimum, a quasi-suspect
classification, if not a suspect classification.240
In addition to its impact on legal arguments for same-sex marriage and voir
dire, SmithKline establishes that sexual orientation has no adverse bearing on a
person’s ability to contribute to the community.241 The Executive Branch has
endorsed this view, with the former U.S. Attorney General stating that “[r]ecent
evolutions in legislation . . . and in social science regarding sexual orientation
all make clear that sexual orientation is not a characteristic that generally bears
on legitimate policy objectives.” 242 Indeed, courts have acknowledged this
proposition for many years.243
SmithKline’s conclusion that no link exists between sexual orientation and the
ability to contribute to society undercuts many of the arguments oppositionists
to LGBT rights advance as “legitimate” bases for discriminatory laws.244 The
Ninth Circuit correctly found that peremptory strikes on the basis of sexual
orientation “continue [a] deplorable tradition [in the United States] of treating
238. See Bartrum, supra note 25, at 147–49 (discussing the Supreme Court’s focus on
DOMA’s impact on the equality of gay men and lesbians in Windsor).
239. 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (affirming that marriage is one of the most rudimentary rights in
civil society).
240. See Bartrum, supra note 25, at 149–50 (commenting that national momentum in the
judicial arena appears to be building in favor of applying heightened scrutiny to sexual orientation
classifications).
241. SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 740 F.3d 471, 486 (9th Cir.), en banc reh’g
denied, 759 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2014). In determining that equal protection disallows striking a
potential juror based on sexual orientation, the SmithKline court cited J.E.B.’s conclusion that
“gender-based strikes send a message ‘that certain individuals . . . are presumed unqualified by
state actors to decide important questions.” Id. at 484 (alteration in original) (quoting J.E.B. v.
Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 142 (1994)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
242. Letter from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Att’y Gen. of the United States, to the Hon. John A.
Boehner, Speaker, U.S. House of Reps. (Feb. 23, 2011), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/
February/11-ag-223.html.
243. See Watkins v. U.S. Army, 875 F.2d 699, 725 (9th Cir. 1989) (Norris, J., concurring)
(“Sexual orientation plainly has no relevance to a person’s ability to perform or contribute to
society.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc.
v. Cincinnati, 860 F. Supp. 417, 437 (S.D. Ohio 1994) (“[S]exual orientation . . . bears no relation
. . . to an individual’s ability to . . . participate in, or contribute to, society. . . . If homosexuals were
afflicted with [an] impediment . . . the entire phenomenon of ‘staying in the [c]loset’ and of ‘coming
out’ would not exist; their impediment would betray their status.”), rev’d on other grounds and
vacated, 54 F.3d 261 (6th Cir. 1995). See generally Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571, 609–14
(Md. 2007) (concluding that a person’s sexual orientation does not correlate with his or her ability
to contribute to society).
244. SmithKline, 740 F.3d at 485–86; see supra notes 232–33 and accompanying text.
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gays and lesbians as undeserving of participation in our nation’s most cherished
rites and rituals.”245 Indeed, SmithKline eliminates the notion that gay men and
lesbians cannot fully “participate in perfecting democracy and guarding our
ideals of justice,” a modest idea that nevertheless many courts are only
beginning to incorporate into their analyses. 246 SmithKline’s concepts of
allowing gay men and lesbians to be treated fairly under the law and participate
fully in society are ones that will carry over to many different areas such as
marriage, employment, and housing, thus ensuring that the nation’s high ideal
of equality is realized a little more. At its core, SmithKline stands for a simple
proposition of fairness: that an otherwise qualified person should be allowed to
bring his or her viewpoint and experiences forward to contribute to the nation’s
civic functions.
VI. CONCLUSION
The U.S. Constitution has been described as “the story of the extension of . .
. rights and protections to people once ignored or excluded.” 247 SmithKline
furthered those protections to a group of people long ostracized and kept to
society’s fringes. Lower federal courts are altering the manner in which they
examine sexual orientation classifications quite rapidly, and SmithKline is a
noteworthy and foundational case in this trend. Where some courts previously
applied rational basis “with bite,”248 SmithKline explicitly applied heightened
scrutiny when it extended Batson’s protections to gay men and lesbians in the
vital civic task of jury duty.
Because of the trend toward heightened scrutiny that SmithKline helped
generate, proponents of disparate treatment under the law based on sexual
orientation classifications will have to show a more significant nexus to an
important government interest to justify that treatment. It may be a difficult task,
given that the courts have eviscerated many of their traditional arguments.

245.
246.
247.
248.

Id. at 485.
Id.; see supra notes 212–32 and accompanying text.
United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 557 (1996).
See Bartrum, supra note 25, at 147.

832

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 64:803

